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Abstract 
Under Japan’s prewar capital stock system of joint-stock companies, rather than paying 
the full face value of a share in one lump sum, shareholders paid for stocks in multiple 
installments. This system was transplanted from industrialized Western nations during 
the Meiji Era to make it easier for investors to buy company shares and to promote 
capital concentrations. Company directors determined the amount of supplementary 
installments on part-paid stocks and when these installments were paid. The 
Commercial Code and Corporate articles of association specified sanctions for 
nonpayment, giving companies the backing needed to call in supplementary 
installments. Supplementary installments functioned as a last resort for corporate 
fund-raising in times of financial distress and played a role in corporate cash 
management and investment. Studies of historical documents such as financial 
statements and company histories show that in the early 1930s of the Great Depression, 
in a time of tight financial markets, many companies raised funds through 
supplementary installments, applying these funds to make investments and repay debts. 
As part of our study, we construct a new corporate financial data set with data on 
supplementary installments encompassing 174 firms, based on the Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki (Performance analysis of 
Japanese companies) and Toyo Keizai’s Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan (Company Year 
Book) and estimate cross-sectional investment functions for the fiscal year of 1932. 
Regression results suggest that while corporate investments were subject to liquidity 
and debt constraints, supplementary installments stabilized corporate cash management 
and promoted corporate investment activities. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent policy discussions concerning reforms of Japan’s financial system have focused 
on policies such as promoting changes in investment trends (“from savings to 
investment”) and establishing effective systems of corporate governance.1 A look back 
on how financial systems, capital markets, and corporate fund-raising functioned 
during the pre-World War II period may provide useful insights and suggestions 
relevant to current conditions. Recent literature on Japanese financial history has 
generally tended to view the financial system of prewar Japan as a direct 
finance-oriented one based on capital markets. Additionally, the complementary 
relationship between direct and indirect finance has increasingly been viewed as an 
essential aspect of the financial system of prewar Japan. In the area of corporate 
finance, research has proceeded on fund-raising based on stocks and bonds and on the 
roles played by shareholders and others in corporate governance.2,3 This paper 
examines the relationship of supplementary installments on part-paid stocks, corporate 
finance, and investment activities in prewar Japan. The issues have rarely been 
analyzed to date in the literature, despite the major role played by part-paid stock and 
supplementary installments in Japan’s prewar financial system. 
   In the capital stock system of prewar joint-stock companies, shareholders paid 
for shares in multiple instruments consisting of a first payment and subsequent 
supplementary payments, rather than paying the full face value in a lump sum at the 
time of subscription. This system was transplanted from industrialized Western 
nations in the Meiji Era and, along with the system of equity-collateral financing, 
expected to promote capital accumulation and concentrations. According to Shimura 
[1969, p.269], the direct goal of this system was to lessen the burden of dividend 
payments on unpaid capital through companies collecting capital as needed, as well as 
to reduce funding burdens on investors and shareholders that would have resulted if 
the system had required large amounts of single payment. Despite undergoing partial 
revisions alongside the establishment and amendment of the Commercial Code during 
                                                  
1  See Financial Services Agency [2004] concerning financial system reforms. 
2  For evaluation of the functions of direct and indirect finance in the prewar financial 
system, see Ishii [1999], Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara [1999], Teranishi [2007], Institute 
for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan [2006], Kataoka [2006], Hoshi and 
Kashyap [2001], Miwa and Ramseyer [2002]. 
3  With respect to corporate governance, Okazaki [1999b], Kasuya [2002], and Nakamura 
[2006] investigate the cases of zaibatsu and large companies. Okazaki [1999a] and 
Miyajima [1995] compare corporate governance in the prewar period to that in the postwar 
period. 
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the Meiji Era, the capital stock system of joint-stock companies allowing part-paid 
stocks and supplementary installments remained in place until amendments to the 
Commercial Code implemented during the post-war occupation. 
   The Commercial Code and corporate articles of association regulated sanctions 
that called for stocks to be seized and sold at auction if shareholders failed to comply 
with calls to submit supplementary installments by the deadlines announced. Given 
these requirements, these installments tend to be made “not at the shareholders’ 
convenience, but at the company’s” (Noda [1980], p. 214). Since companies were 
relatively free to use supplementary installments at their discretion in contrast to 
other means of fund-raising, such as bank loans and corporate bonds,4 the part-paid 
stock system gave companies access to funds even when investors were unwilling to 
provide funds and financial markets were tight. Consequently, supplementary 
installments effectively functioned as “a last resort for corporate fund raising,” as 
described in the Japanese literature on financial history (Shimura [1969]).5 According 
to the theory of corporate finance, given the information asymmetry between borrowers 
and lenders, companies were unable to raise sufficient funds, constraining corporate 
investment activities.6 Collecting supplementary installments on part-paid stock may 
have helped ease such liquidity constraints and promoted corporate investment.7 
   This paper investigates the relationship between supplementary installments 
on part-paid stock, corporate finance and investment activities in interwar Japan, 
primarily in the early 1930s, drawing on both historical documents and firm-level 
financial data. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
                                                  
4  However, this does not necessarily mean that managers had dominant influence in 
corporate governance. Okazaki [1999a] investigates the case for the strength of 
shareholders during the interwar period, arguing shareholders held ultimate control of 
corporate activities through the appointment and dismissal of directors at shareholder 
meetings. Managers’ decisions on supplementary installments were made within this 
framework. 
5  From the shareholders’ perspective, the fact that the company was free to make demands 
upon them to provide funds in the form of supplementary installments meant that they 
served as an option for the company from the time the shares were first underwritten. To 
what extent shareholders recognized this effect and whether they demanded additional 
returns in exchange for providing this option are important questions not addressed in this 
paper. 
6  Bernanke [1995, 2000], who analyzed the Great Depression in the United States, argues 
that asset deflation drove down the collateral value of borrowers’ net assets and asset 
holdings that reduced agency costs due to information asymmetry, impeding financial 
intermediation and exacerbating economic problems. 
7  Saito [2006] investigates Karafuto Industry as a case where supplementary 
installments eased liquidity constraints and induced overinvestment.   
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the establishment process during the Meiji Era of the capital stock system of 
joint-stock companies allowing part-paid stocks and supplementary installments; 
describes its institutional framework and functions; and examines, based on historical 
materials such as financial statements and company histories, the development of 
fund-raising and investment activities at representative companies that called in 
supplementary installments during the Showa depression of the early 1930s. Section 3 
examines the effects of supplementary installments on corporate investment on a 
quantitative basis. Drawing on the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute’s Honpo 
Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and Toyo Keizai’s Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan, we construct a 
new firm-level financial data set for 174 firms in the fiscal year of 1932 to estimate 
cross-sectional investment functions. Section 4 summarizes the analyses presented in 
this paper and gives brief suggestions for future research directions. 
 
2. Establishment of the system of supplementary payment in stocks and its function in 
Japan 
2.1 Establishment of the system of supplementary payment in stocks8 
 When a company was established in prewar Japan, as stated above, it had to find 
subscribers for all shares. The subscribers were then required to pay a portion of the 
face value of each share. Although this payment system lacked a proper legal basis 
until the promulgation of the Commercial Code of Japan in 1890 (enacted in 1893 
following a minor amendment), it was already in widespread use in Japan before this 
law. The National Bank Act of 1872, which established the first joint-stock-company 
system in Japan, stipulated that before a national bank could open its doors and 
receive a license to operate, at least one-half of the face value of its stock had to paid. 
The remainder could then be paid in monthly installments of 10% of the face value, 
beginning the month following licensing. The full face value would be paid no later 
than six months following bank licensing.9 Thus, while a system of installment 
payments did in fact exist at this time, it played a relatively minor role, since the 
timeframe for which shares were not paid in full was a mere six months. 
   Companies claiming limited liability status modeled on national banks were 
established afterwards, with their numbers swelling rapidly after 1886. The Tokyo 
                                                  
8  Except as noted otherwise, the contents here are based on Noda [1980], Imuta [1976], 
Miyamoto [1990], Takamura [1996], and Aochi [2006]. 
9  Shares were forfeited by shareholders who failed to make this payment and were then 
auctioned. If no buyer was found, the shares were retired (Meiji Zaiseishi Hensankai [1972], 
pp. 41-42). 
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Stock Exchange (established 1878), Tokio Marine Insurance (established 1879), and 
Meiji Life Insurance (established 1881), all well-known among companies established 
before 1886, adopted share payment systems more or less identical to those for national 
banks. The Tokyo Stock Exchange had two-thirds of its nominal capitalization paid in 
as of the day before its opening, with the remainder paid in following notification by 
the president and directors. The shares were delivered to shareholders only after the 
entire amount was fully paid in. The 1878 balance sheet for the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
shows no unpaid capital (Hiraga [1928]). Tokio Marine Insurance had one-half of its 
capital paid in during the month in which the company obtained authorization from 
the Japanese government, another one-quarter within 60 days thereafter, and the final 
one-quarter within another 60 days. It also delivered share certificates following 
payment of the full amount. According to Tokio Marine Insurance’s balance sheets, the 
entire amount had been paid in by the end of 1879 (Japan Business History Institute 
[1979]). One-fifth of Meiji Life Insurance’s capitalization was paid in within five days 
following the first general meeting of shareholders and another one-fifth every three 
months thereafter; the total amount had been paid by the 13th month following the 
first general meeting. According to balance sheets, of 100,000 yen in capital, 40,000 yen 
had been paid in by the end of 1881. The entire amount had been paid in by the end of 
1882 (Meiji Life Insurance [1955]). Since these three companies made every effort to 
have the entire amount of capital paid in within approximately one year following their 
establishment, the payment system used by the three companies were not entirely 
different from that for national banks. 
   These three companies belonged to the financial industry, and their primary 
source of funding was liabilities. With the exception of modest fixed assets (e.g., 
buildings), their capital was expected to serve as security for the companies’ debts. In 
contrast, in the manufacturing and transport industries, which made use of fixed 
assets on a larger scale, the need for funds increased as plants and railways were 
constructed. Since a company’s capitalization at this time tended to be determined by 
the funds needed to acquire fixed assets (plants or machinery), companies did not need 
to have their entire capitalization on hand when first established (i.e., when they first 
began constructing their fixed assets). For this reason, from the very early stages of 
their respective industries, companies appear to have chosen to forego full collection of 
their capital before startup, although the figure for total capital had been determined. 
The articles of association of Shoshi Kaisha (Oji Paper’s predecessor) in November 1872 
specify that of its total capitalization of 150,000 yen, 100,000 yen would be raised to 
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pay startup costs (for example, to buy machinery), while the remaining 50,000 yen 
would be collected later (Oji Paper [2001]). In 1874, Shoshi Kaisha merged with 
Keiteisha, issuing 2.25 new shares of stock (at 1,000 yen per share). By October 1874, 
its paid-in capital was 152,250 yen, received via nine separate installments. However, 
since this amount was less than that needed to purchase the required machinery, the 
company sought to increase its capitalization once again near the end of 1874. After 
five more payments, its paid-in capital as of June 1876 totaled 261,600 yen.10 Soshi 
Kaisha appears to have been one of the earliest companies in the manufacturing sector 
for which shares were paid in installments. 
   The cases of Osaka Cotton Spinning (hereafter OCS) and Japan Railway are 
worth examining, in part because the process of such payments for these companies is 
well documented. OCS was founded in 1879 by Ei-ichi Shibusawa and his partners. 
Shibusawa took various preparatory measures to establish the company, asking Takeo 
Yamanobe to seek out on-the-job training at a mill in the United Kingdom. In October 
1880, the company finally set a target capitalization of 250,000 yen. Mill construction 
began in 1882, and part of the mill began operating in July 1883. In December 1882, 
the company increased its capital to 280,000 yen. The company’s first semi-annual 
report included “various specifics of business performance, from the start of operations 
through July 5, 1883, and circumstances and accounts for the six-month period from 
that date through December 28.” This suggests that the company regarded the period 
from its startup to the beginning of operations (about four years) as a single accounting 
period, perhaps due to the ambiguity of the establishment of the company. As a result, 
the company’s balance sheets do not illustrate the process of capital inflow. However, a 
document entitled “Income Statement of Osaka Spinning, June 30, 1883” included in 
the first semi-annual report clearly shows that capital had been paid in in eight 
installments. Although the timing of these payments remains unclear, the company 
raised funds for purposes such as startup costs, equipment purchases, and mill 
construction over a certain period (Fig. 1). Since the first payment of capital took place 
in January 1881 (Takamura [1971], p. 64), subsequent payments appear to have been 
made over a period of approximately two years extending through 1882. The amount of 
paid-in capital on the company’s balance sheet at the end of its first fiscal year is 
265,000 yen, indicating that one-half (15,000 yen) of the amount of the capital increase 
                                                  
10  Shares of Shoshi Kaisha included fractions of less than one share. It appears that the 
concept of a single indivisible share was not universally held at this time.   
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of 30,000 yen had been paid in. The new shares were also paid in installments.11 
   The railway industry required even longer construction periods. Japan 
Railway, which linked Tokyo to Maebashi and Aomori, received startup authorization 
in November 1881, with a proposed capitalization of 20 million yen. Unable to raise 
this amount immediately, it sought to raise a partial amount. The application for 
incorporation submitted in May 1881 indicates subscriptions for 119,445 shares. While 
some shares were forfeited for reasons such as failure to pay, the company continued to 
issue shares through May 1884, changing the number of shares issued (Fig. 2). Since 
the company's founding predated the Commercial Code, it was possible to begin 
operating even before subscribers had been found for all shares. Additionally, the 
principle of finalizing capital amounts (i.e., clearly stating the capital figure in the 
articles of association) had yet to be established. Although company management had 
proposed a payment period of two years, the governors of the Tohoku region, who 
offered to sell shares to wealthy individuals living near the railway, demanded a period 
of seven years. A period of six years was ultimately set. The company began operating 
trains between Tokyo and Kumagaya in 1883 and gradually extended its line 
thereafter, completing the route to Aomori in 1891. Before the entire amount of the 
first offering of stock was to be paid in 1885, Japan Railway had doubled its 
capitalization, and the company had not found subscribers for all of its shares. In 1881, 
the entire amount of the first offering of stock was paid in in six years, as planned. 
Since the Japanese government provided shareholders with 8% interest, the company’s 
semi-annual reports were issued before trains began operating. Due to the long-term 
payments clearly indicated by the reports, Japan Railway is the most notable company 
in the early stages of Japan's industrialization whose shares were paid in in 
installments. 
   A number of spinning and railway companies modeled on OSC and Japan 
Railway were established in the boom times between 1886 and 1890. Most shares in 
companies established during this period were paid in installments, establishing the 
convention in Japan of payment for shares by installment. At the time, none of the 
leading capitalist nations—the United Kingdom, United States, France, or 
Germany—required payment of the full face value of each share at the time of company 
establishment. Policymakers or businesspeople who examined Western stock systems 
                                                  
11  Capital of 265,000 yen was entered on the credit side of the balance sheet. The practice 
of entering capital of 280,000 yen on the credit side and unpaid capital of 15,000 yen on the 
debit side would only become accepted practice some time later.   
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were naturally inclined to accept installment payments. Moreover, this approach was 
favored by investors, since it required payment only as construction progressed. For 
these reasons, this system spread across Japan. 
   So far, our analysis has focused on the process whereby the installment 
payment system spread across Japan, albeit without solid legal foundations. We will 
now consider how the Commercial Code addressed this system. The draft version of the 
code, written by Karl Friedrich Hermann Roesler and published by the Ministry of 
Justice in 1884, stipulated installment payments for stock, based on French and 
German commercial laws. The part-paid stock system was incorporated into the 
Commercial Code of 1890. The Commercial Code required the company to find 
subscribers for all shares at the time the company was established and required the 
payment of at least one-quarter of the face value of all shares to discourage the 
proliferation of companies with very low ratios of paid-in capital to capital.12 The 
minimum face value of a single share was 20 yen in general, but 50 yen for companies 
with capital of 100,000 yen or more. Although dividends were paid in proportion to the 
amount paid in per share, the voting rights corresponding to a fully-paid stock was 
identical to that of a part-paid stock. Articles of association were permitted to restrict 
the voting rights of those owning 11 or more shares. If a shareholder failed to pay in 
the amount called, his or her shares were forfeited and auctioned. If the auction price 
was less than the amount called, the shareholder whose shares were forfeited was 
obligated to make up the difference. Until one-half of the face value had been paid in, if 
the shareholder failed to make up the difference, the former shareholder was subject to 
security obligations for two years following his or her sale.   
   The new Commercial Code promulgated and established in 1899 further 
refined the system of payment in stock, requiring the articles of association to clearly 
state the amount of capital and the face value per share and requiring articles of 
association to be amended in general shareholders’ meetings. It also required capital 
increases to be determined by resolution of a general meeting of shareholders. However, 
since supplementary installments were not legally subject to resolutions of the general 
meeting of shareholders, demands for payment were made in most cases by a 
resolution of the board of directors. When issuing stock at a price above the face value, 
companies were required to collect the amount in excess of the face value at the same 
time as the initial payment. A face value of 20 yen was permitted only if the entire 
                                                  
12  Under special legal conditions applying to railways, only one-tenth needed to be paid in. 
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amount was paid in one lump sum, and face values of less than 50 yen were prohibited 
in other instances. If a shareholder failed to make a payment and thereby forfeited his 
or her shares, a call for payment was submitted to the sellers of the shares (the former 
shareholders). If no party responded to this call, the shares were sold at auction. If the 
amount received at auction fell short of the payment amount called in, the company 
was entitled to seek payment from the shareholder who had forfeited the shares. If the 
amount could not be collected at this juncture, the company was entitled to demand 
payment from the sellers of the shares. The sellers of the shares bore this responsibility 
for a period of two years following the sale of the shares.13 In addition, no capital 
increase was permitted unless the shares issued earlier had been fully paid in.14 All 
these measures helped establish the installment payment system in prewar Japan, a 
system that survived until the 1948 amendments to the Commercial Code. 
   Widely accepted views tend to stress that the system of payment of stock in 
installments performed the following three functions: (1) It reduced the burden of 
payment on shares with high face values; (2) it reduced dividend burdens by collecting 
payments in accordance with construction status; and (3) it enabled collection of 
unpaid capital after a company’s bankruptcy, protecting creditors and thereby easing 
credit (Noda [1980] p. 79, Aochi [2006]). With respect to the first function, since issuing 
shares with a face value of 50 yen paid in four installments (12.5 yen each) reduced the 
initial payment burden to roughly one-half that for shares with a face value of 20 yen 
paid in one lump sum, multiple stock payments broadened the shareholder base. The 
anticipated burden of paying the full amount for shares offered at 50 yen per share 
may have discouraged small-scale investors; the installment part-paid stock system 
was far less discouraging because shareholders were able to sell part-paid stocks when 
necessary. With respect to the second function, increasing capital in accordance with 
the progress of construction could reduce a company’s dividend burdens as well. 
Part-paid stock system had implicit advantages which issuing several sets of smaller 
numbers of fully paid in shares, staggered at intervals, could not offer. For example, 
the part-paid stock system eliminated operating costs associated with issuing shares in 
multiple capital-raising efforts. Also, the requirement of a resolution of the general 
                                                  
13  Although this responsibility may have impeded circulation of stock with unpaid portions 
remaining, such stock was listed and widely traded. 
14  Under special legal conditions, companies in industries such as railways, electric power, 
and insurance were permitted to issue new shares without having the entire amount paid 
in. In addition, the amendment to the Commercial Code in 1938 permitted companies to 
issue new shares without having the entire amount paid in. 
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meeting of shareholders to increase capitalization made it difficult to raise funds 
swiftly, something the part-paid system made possible by requiring merely a resolution 
of the board of directors.15 In addition, the installment payment system allowed 
collection of payments even under financial conditions in which raising capital by other 
means might prove difficult. Fourth, while shareholders would not always respond to 
demands for payment, some shareholders would pay in out of fear of forfeiture. Since 
the company was entitled to demand payment from the original shareholder (and from 
the buyer at the time of auction), if proceeds from the forfeiture and auction of the 
shares fell short of the payment demanded, prospects for successful fundraising were 
better than those through new issues. With respect to the third function, it is 
well-known that English joint stock banks issued part-paid stock and won the 
confidence of depositors.16 Part-paid stocks have had the effect of supplementing 
company credit. However, numerous cases in which a company failed to collect 
sufficient funds in this manner when bankruptcies occurred have also provoked 
creditors’ anger. 
 
2.2 The roles played by supplementary installments: Six case studies drawn from the 
Showa depression 
 In this section, we consider how companies raised funds during the Showa depression, 
when capital markets were very tight, by calling in unpaid capital from shareholders. 
Here we discuss six companies – Shirokiya, a department store; Tokyo Underground 
Railway (hereafter TUR); Dainihon Sugar Refinery (hereafter DSR); Oita Cement; Keio 
Electric Railway; and Ujigawa Electric Power – and examine the effects of such 
measures on investment at these companies.   
    In November 1930, Shirokiya collected payment of 5 yen per share on 100,000 
shares for which 40 yen per share had already been paid in. These funds were used to 
pay for the second phase of construction of its main store, for which the first phase had 
begun in 1929. At the time of this fundraising, the price of a part-paid stock of 
Shirokiya on the markets was only 6 yen. Despite the harsh environment, investors 
forfeited no more than 288 shares; 99,712 shares had been paid in at the end of 
                                                  
15  Under the authorized-capital system adopted by amendment of the Commercial Code in 
1950, capital could be increased up to the authorized capital amount, subject only to a 
resolution of the board of directors. 
16  In Japan, supplementary installments were collected to cover losses or to refund deposits 
in the event of bankruptcy or suspension of bank operations. See Aochi [2006] concerning 
the case of Jugo Bank. 
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January 1931. The forfeited shares were auctioned, and by March, full payment had 
been made for all outstanding part-paid shares. In May 1931, Shirokiya called in 
payment of the remaining 5 yen. The full original face value of the 50-yen shares was 
paid in by June.17  
   By the end of 1929, TUR had completed construction from Asakusa to 
Manseibashi and had begun work to extend its line from Manseibashi to Shinbashi 
(TUR [1939]). To raise the necessary funds, it launched an offering in April 1930, 
issuing a second round of 400,000 new shares for which it demanded initial payment of 
5 yen per share. However, due to the difficulty of raising funds during the Showa 
depression, the company borrowed four million yen from the Industrial Bank of Japan 
(hereafter IBJ) in November 1930 and borrowed another 4 million yen in November 
1931 from the same bank, with these loans secured by a railway foundation (TUR 
borrowed an additional 500,000 yen in May 1932 from the IBJ). In the second half of 
1932, it successfully concluded 10.5 million yen in financing agreements with a 
syndicate consisting of the IBJ and four trust companies: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, 
and Yasuda. Over this period, it called in payment of 2 million yen (in April 1931) and 
4 million yen (in April 1932). In April 1930, the current price of the company’s 15-yen 
paid-in stock stood at about 15 yen, indicating relatively health market conditions for 
TUR. The 1931 payment demand resulted in the collection of 1,910,000 yen by June, 
and the full amount had been collected by October 21. The 1932 payment demand 
resulted in the collection of approximately 90% of the total amount by June. Although 
93,385 yen remained unpaid at the end of November, a substantial portion of the 
payments had been made. The 1931 capital call was a precondition for loans from the 
IBJ secured by the railway foundation.18 TUR and Shirokiya invested in their fixed 
assets by raising capital from holders of part-paid shares in times when capital 
markets were tight. For TUR, raising capital in this way was a prerequisite for 
obtaining additional bank loans. 
   In November 1930, DSR called in payment of 12.5 yen on its first issue of new 
shares (170,000 shares), 5 yen on its second issue of new shares (316,000 shares), and 
12.5 yen on its third issue of new shares (135,000 shares), raising a total of 5,392,500 
                                                  
17  Diamond, October 1, 1930; Semi-annual report of Shirokiya; each period. Shirokiya 
planned to use funds on hand to cover construction costs that could not be covered by 
payment for part-paid shares. 
18  Semi-annual report of TUR, each period. Since the company belonged to the railway 
industry, it was permitted to issue a second round of new shares before the full amount of 
the first round had been paid in. 
    10  
yen.19 The company had imported raw sugar from Java and refined it in Japan until 
the 1920s, when it ventured into the raw-sugar business in Taiwan. Despite raising the 
needed funds through liabilities, it announced a call for payment in August 1930, when 
the price of its various shares dropped below the respective paid-in amounts. Since it 
had not collected payment in the late 1920s on first venturing into the raw-sugar 
industry in Taiwan, the stock markets had not anticipated this demand for payment; 
and since the demand was made during a period of declining stock prices, some 
observers speculated the company faced dire financial conditions, with banks 
pressuring it to repay loans. The company’s stock prices fell dramatically.20 By the end 
of April, however, full payments had been made, although 127 shareholders forfeited 
their shares. These forfeited shares were auctioned in March 1931. Efforts to collect 
payments suffered less than one might have expected, given the focus on the rapid 
decline in company shares. In fact, the company issued statements to shareholders 
explaining that it was not being pressured by banks to repay debts and that the 
purpose of the payment call was “to repay long-term debts and to secure working 
funds” (Nishihara [1934], p. 186). The company’s balance sheets back up these claims: 
its product inventory increased by 7,080,000 yen from the end of October 1930 through 
the end of April 1931, while notes payable decreased by no more than 30,000 yen. All 
funds raised from shareholders were in fact invested into current assets.21 In this case, 
then, the company raised funds from holders of part-paid stock to carry inventory due 
to poor sales. 
   Finally, we examine three companies forced to raise funds from part-paid 
stock holders due to pressures to repay debts. We should note the difficulty of clearly 
distinguishing such companies from companies seeking to raise funds to make 
investments, since the bank loans being called in had often been used for investments. 
We begin with Oita Cement. Facing poor business results, it partnered with Onoda 
Cement and entrusted sales to Mitsui & Co., which was expected to provide financial 
assistance to Oita Cement. With Oita Cement needing additional funds, the IBJ 
demanded that Oita call in payment on shares as a precondition for a loan of 1.5 
million yen secured by its plant. In June 1930, Oita Cement collected payment of 6.5 
                                                  
19  Due to mergers, DSR had issued three issues of part-paid stock. 
20  Diamond, September 1, 1930; Economist, September 15, 1930. The company’s stock had 
the following prices on September 1: for older stock for which 50 yen had been paid in, 31.2 
yen; for the first issue of new stock, for which 37.5 yen had been paid in, 15.3 yen; for the 
second issue of new stock for which 20 yen had been paid in, 6.5 yen; and for the third issue 
of new stock for which 12.5 yen had been paid in, 1.3 yen. 
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yen per share of part-paid stock (127,200 shares). Although the company’s part-paid 
stock (of which 30 yen had been paid in) at that time was valued at no more than 0.2 
yen per share, no more than 7,572 shares (owned by 165 shareholders) were forfeited, 
and payment had been completed for all shares by February 1931. The company’s goal 
was to repay unsecured short-term debts of 2.3 million yen with the funds raised from 
shareholders and the IBJ.22 While this capital increase may have been intended to 
modify its capital structure as part of restructuring efforts, the effort succeeded 
because business performance, with the participation of Onoda Cement and Mitsui & 
Co., was expected to improve.   
   Keio Electric Railway invested to expand and improve its existing lines, 
establish the Keiokaku amusement park (in 1927), and expand its power-supply 
business, resulting in growth in fixed assets during the latter half of the 1920s. While 
the company had raised most of the required funds by issuing notes payable, in 
September 1930, Keio Electric Railway collected 5 yen per share on its third issue of 
130,000 shares of stock to repay bank loans. Although the market value of the 25-yen 
stock reached a low point of 19.7 yen during that September, full payment had been 
completed by November, with the company raising 650,000 yen (Since the 650,000 yen 
fell short of the amount needed to repay its debts, the company issued corporate bonds 
totaling 5 million yen in November 1930). Comparisons of figures for May and 
November 1930 show an increase of 500,000 yen in fixed assets, indicating the results 
of investment during a credit crunch.23  
   Ujigawa Electric Power serves as another example of a company that raised 
funds from holders of part-paid shares both to make investments and to repay debts. 
To repay debts and to expand its power lines and transformers in response to increased 
demand, the company in March 1931 collected payment of 10 yen per share on its 
part-paid stock (872,667 shares).24 The lowest price in February 1931 for the c
part-paid stock, for which 30 yen had been paid in, was 29 yen. Perhaps because the
share price was maintained largely at the paid-in amount, no more than 8,380 yen 
remained unpaid as of March 1931. Comparisons of figures for September 1930 and 
March 1931 show that while the amount in bonds had actually decreased by 560,000 
ompany’s 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
21  Semi-annual report of DSR, each period. 
22  Economist, July 1, 1930; Semi-annual report of Oita Cement, each period. Also, see Kato 
[2004]. 
23  Diamond, September 11, 1930; Semi-annual report of Keio Electric Railway, each period. 
24  Toyo Keizai (Oriental Economist), January 10, 1931; Semi-annual report of Ujigawa 
Electric Power, each period. 
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yen, other debts increased by 190,000 yen. While the decline in debts was modest, t
funds raised were mainly used for facilities expansion, primarily power-line eq
   The six cases a
he 
uipment. 
bove demonstrate how the part-paid stock and installment 
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payment system made it possible for companies to raise funds on demand (although
immediately) from shareholders under poor financial conditions, including cases in 
which stock prices had fallen below the paid-in amount. The funds raised were inves
into fixed assets or inventory or used to repay creditors. 
   What was the most common reason for such pay
the motives for payment collection as raising investment funds, debt repayment, or 
both, based on articles on collection of payment carried in the business magazines 
Economist, Diamond, and Toyo Keizai over the period from 1930 through 1932 
ignoring the amounts of paid-in funds). As already seen, although in some case
magazine articles did not address the purpose of collection accurately (or the funds 
were used for other than their stated purpose), the figure gives a clear sense of the 
overall picture. Collection for investment was the most common motive (42%), follow
by both investment and debt repayment (33%) and debt repayment (24%). This 
suggests stock supplementary installments were closely tied to both company ca
investments and cash flow. 
 
3
3.1 Earlier research and a framework for analysis 
In Section 2, we showed that when financial marke
many companies raised funds by calling in supplementary installments on part-paid 
stock, using the funds thus raised to invest or to repay loans. This section examines th
effects of supplementary installments on corporate investment. 
Many previous case studies have addressed the investm
irms in interwar Japan. Here, we review previous studies analyzing the 
relationship between the developments of aggregated corporate investments and 
financial conditions in the early 1930s.25 Asajima [1995] totaled the balance sheet
 
25  For financial and economic developments during the interwar period, see Takeda [1983] 
and Nakamura [1989]. As a brief summary of economic developments during the 1932 fiscal 
 
 
year (covered in Section 3 [Table 4]), although real GNP returned to positive territory under
the Takahashi's economic policies of expanding exports and government spending, 
private-sector investment continued to decline from fiscal 1931, as did prices (GNP deflator). 
Bank lending continued to decline. Payments on bonds and stock in capital markets
remained low. Although stock prices had rebounded from their 1930 lows, they remained 
depressed. Land prices (rice paddies) remained in a declining trend. 
    13  
111 to 155 companies based on Osakaya Shoten’s Kabushiki Nenkan and examined 
changes in their fixed assets and fund-raising at four points in time: in 1919, 1926, 
1931, and 1936. His study indicated that growth in fixed assets slowed in many 
industries in 1931, with the exception of railways and electric power companies that 
raised funds for investment through bonds. Fujino and Teranishi [2000] used the 
Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki to analyzed the 
relationship between corporate fund-raising and assets during the first half of fiscal 
1933. Their results indicated that companies tended to raise long-term funds in a 
manner proportional to changes in fixed assets. Miyajima [2004] used the Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and other sources to get 
balance sheets for 54 companies during the period from 1921 to 1927 and for 64 
companies during the period from 1933 to 1937, estimating investment functions in 
each period to determine whether liquidity constraints, debt constraints, or 
membership in zaibatsu groups affected corporate investment activities. 
   After compiling a corporate financial database incorporating data on 
supplementary installments on part-paid stocks, we estimate investment functions in 
the form in which supplementary installments and other means of fund-raising are 
added to the Miyajima’s [2004] estimation model as independent variables and 
examine the effects of supplementary installments on corporate investment. Analysis 
based on firm-level data makes it possible to examine more precisely the relationship 
between supplementary installments and corporate investment activities by controlling 
for the characteristics of companies other than supplementary installments. For two 
reasons, we focus on fiscal 1932, during the interwar period, for our estimates of 
cross-sectional investment functions. First, previous research has shown that 
supplementary installments played a significant role in corporate fund-raising, 
particularly in times of tight financial markets. Second, data from the Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki is available only for fiscal 
1931 and beyond, allowing year-on-year comparisons only from fiscal 1932. 
 
3.2 Data and estimation model 
3.2.1 Data 
Of the data needed for estimates, data on fixed assets, liabilities, sales, net income, and 
depreciation, and other corporate financial data is drawn from the Mitsubishi 
Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki. Since the accounts on the 
  balance sheets in corporate financial statements in prewar Japan vary from company
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to company, all companies tended to define fixed asset accounts in different ways, 
making direct comparisons problematic. Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki totals each 
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26 Gross investment is used as a representative variable for investmen
which is calculated by subtracting the amount of fixed assets at the end of the 1931 
fiscal year from that at the end of the 1932 fiscal year and adding depreciation for the
1932 fiscal year.27 Since fixed assets include land, the investment figures also 
encompass land investments. This is because data on fixed assets in Honpo 
Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki cannot be divided into land and depreciable assets, and b
land investments were crucial for numerous companies in their efforts to exp
his reason, we chose to include land investment in our analyses. 
   Since the amount of unpaid capital on the balance sheet declines when 
supplementary installments are made, we consider this decline in 
re t the amount of supplementary installment payments made.28 We used 
data from Toyo Keizai’s Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan, since Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Buns
does not provide data on unpaid capital. 
   Matching the data from Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and Kabushiki Gaisha 
Nenkan, we compiled a financial databas
u apital can change for reasons apart from payment of supplementary 
nstallments (e.g., when balance sheets for multiple companies are consolidated in 
mergers or acquisitions), we excluded from our sample companies involved in 
or acquisitions during fiscal 1932. We relied on Chapter Seven (a summary of comp
histories) of Toyo Keizai’s Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan, Osakaya Shoten’s Kabushiki 
Nenkan, and financial statements of individual companies to determine whether such 
mergers or acquisitions had occurred. Our sample of 174 companies included 105 
anufacturing firms and 69 non-manufacturing firms.29 Although the fiscal years of 
                                                  
26  See Saito [2004b] concerning the characteristics of the data provided in Honpo 
Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki. The study pointed out that “the only comprehensive database 




minal capital was booked to 
kdown of the companies included in Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki by sector shows 
 
oolen firms, two hemp spinning firms, 12 
multiple companies is the Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute’s Honpo Jigyo-S
Bunseki, covering the year 1930 and beyond...” He went on to emphasize the difficulty
quantitative analysis for company activities before 1930. 
27  For depreciation of investment during the prewar Japan, see Takadera[1974] and Saito 
2004a]. 
28  In the account processing used in the prewar period, no
capital accounts and unpaid capital to assets. 
29  A brea
the following companies in the manufacturing sector: two silk textile firms, nine cotton
spinning firms, five cotton textile firms, four w
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the various companies started and ended in different months, in accordance with 
Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki, we treated any fiscal year ending during the period 
arch 1932 through February 1933 as the 1932 fiscal year. M the 
.2.2 Estimation model 
e investment function is given below. 
I/K = α + β1ΔY/K + β2CF/K + β3DE/AS + β4SI/K + ΣγDummy + ε 
The dependent variable on the left side of the equation (I/K) represents 
. Since 
m on the right-hand side of the equation is a constant (α); the 
second is year-on-year changes in sales in fiscal 1932 (ΔY, normalized to fixed assets as 
of the end of fiscal 1931); the third is cash flow (CF, net income after tax plus 
     
30 Our sample includes 
companies examined in Section 2: Shirokiya, Tokyo Underground Railway, Dai-Nippon 
Sugar, Oita Cement, Keio Electric Railway, and Ujigawa Electric Power. 
 
3





investment (I) in the fiscal year of 1932 normalized to fiscal 1931 fixed assets (K)
estimates of the investment function in this paper are based on cross-section data at a 
single period and fluctuations in equipment prices are relatively insignificant, we use 
nominal values.31,32 
   The first ter
                                                                                                                                              
cement firms, two brick firms, two glass firms, one pharmaceuticals firm, three industrial 
chemicals firms, one dye firm, one paint firm, four artificial thread firms, five paper firms, 
three artificial fertilizer firms, three other chemical firms, three electrical machinery firms, 
six shipbuilding firms, nine machinery firms, five steel firms, three metalworking firms, 
four brewery firms, six sugar refining firms, three flour milling firms, two snack and bread 
firms, three petroleum firms, and two silk reeling firms. The nonmanufacturing sector 
includes two warehouse firms, 22 railways, six steamship firms, one shipping firm, three 
trade firms, four department stores, nine mining firms, four oil firms, nine electrical power 
firms, one fisheries firm, six land and building firms, and two printing firms. 
30  This category is used for companies whose accounting term is six months. For companies 
(e.g., those in the silk reeling industry) whose accounting term is 12 months, a fiscal year 
ending during the period June 1932 through May 1933 is regarded as fiscal 1932. This 
paper uses the definition by Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki. 
31  Since the Commercial Code amended in 1911 required booked and assessed asset values 
to be below current market values, investment should have partially reflected fluctuations 
in equipment prices through fixed asset revaluation . See Aochi [2003] concerning the 
prewar corporate accounting practice of booking assets at below current market value. 
32  It should be noted that companies experiencing declining business performance may 
have revalued assets at other than their actual values. Takahashi [1930] highlighted the 
possibility that 21 firms that had gone bankrupt during the 1920s had engaged in account 
processing practices such as arbitrary booking of revaluation gains. Others pointed out that 
since depreciation was voluntary and booked at the company's discretion, not according to 
established rules, depreciation tended to decrease in times of poor business performance. 
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33 normalized to fixed 
assets as of the end of fiscal 1931); and the fourth is the ratio of debt to assets (DE/AS). 
This equation is based on a regression in Miyajima [2004] incorporating liquid
constraints and debt constraints in an investment function with the acceleration 
principle. When the cost of external funds exceeds that of internal funds due to 
information asymmetry, internal funds receive priority for funding investments, w
investments beyond internal funds are constrained.34 Under such liquidity constr
the coefficient of cash flow is expected to be positive. For a company facing debt 
overhang, even with prospects of returns from new investment, it may become 
impossible to make the necessary arrangements between existing creditors and new 
creditors concerning distributions of returns, making it difficult for the company
engage in new fund-raising and investment efforts. Under such debt constraints
would expect the coefficient of the ratio of debt to assets to be negative. The fifth term
is supplementary installments on part-paid stock (SI, normalized to fixed assets as o
the end of FY 1931). This coefficient is expected to be positive when supplementary 
installments have a positive impact on investment. The sixth term is a dummy variable
added to control for the effects of industry type. 
   We use ordinary least squares (OLS) as the estimation method. In cases of 
cross-section data, the variance of the error terms may not be uniformly distributed. 
Where such heteroskedasticity is present, the sta
coefficients by OLS is imprecise.35 In our estimate, White’s test for heteroskedasticit
rejects the null hypothesis that the variance of error terms is uniformly distributed.36
Accordingly, we apply White’s corrections to calculate standard errors for the estim
coefficients and to test significant levels of estimated coefficients by the t-statistic, 
based on corrected standard errors.37 
                                                  
33  For a discussion of how directors’ bonuses were determined in the prewar Japan, see 
Okazaki [1999a] and Yokoyama [2001]. 
34  For theories regarding the effects of liquidity constraint and debt constraint on 
e 
, see Ogawa [2007], and Fukuda, Kasuya, and 
esis that the variance of error term is uniformly distributed was rejected 
rsection terms. 
made 
 the reverse relationship, in 
investment and empirical analyses on the relation between financial crises and corporat
investment activities in the 1990s Japan
Nakajima [2007]. 
35  We use EViews statistical software. See Matsuura and Mackenzie [2005] for usage of 
EViews and the issue of ununiform variance. 
36  The null hypoth
at the 1% level for both the case including intersection terms between independent 
variables and the case not including such inte
37  A problem of instantaneity bias arises when estimating investment functions. In this 
paper, considering supplementary installments and cash flow affect investment, we 
our estimates using these as independent variables. However,
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3.2.3 Descriptive statistics 







supplementary installments (22 companies, referred to hereinafter as the 
 
  
Table 5 shows descriptive st
of investment is 0.033, with a minimum value of -0.358, a maximum of 0.347, and a 
standard deviation of 0.070. We see considerable variation from company to company
and from industry to industry.38,39 Investment rates are high in industries such as 
flour milling, rayon, oil, department stores, and machine industries, but negative in
industries such as artificial fertilizers and steel, suggesting significant differences in 
companies’ strategies on investment during the recovery from the Showa depression. 
   With respect to independent variables, the average rate of year-on-year 
changes in sales is 0.053, with a minimum value of -0.299, a maximum of 1.410, a
standard deviation of 0.174. Industries such as flour milling, metals, department stores
cotton spinning, cotton textiles, and steel had high sales growth rates, while industries 
such as paper, artificial fertilizer, and silk textiles had negative growth rates. The 
average rate of cash flow is 0.048, with a minimum value of -0.110, a maximum of 
0.430, and a standard deviation of 0.063. Industries such as the flour milling, wool,
cement, and cotton spinning had high cash flow rates, while industries such as 
shipbuilding had negative rates. The average ratio of debt to assets is 0.363, wit
ratios for railways and electric power, which expanded fixed assets by bond financing. 
The average rate of supplementary installments is 0.007, with high rates in industries 
such as department stores, rayon, flour milling, electric power, railways, and sugar. 
   When we divide the companies in our sample into those that collected 
“supplementary installment sample”) and those that did not (152 companies, referred
                                                                                                                                                 
which investment affects supplementary installments and cash flow, is also conceivable. 
Possible ways to rigorously verify the former relationship include instrumental variables or 
lagged independent variables. However, finding appropriate instrumental variables proved 
difficult, and since Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and other sources did not include data on 
supplementary installments and cash flow for fiscal 1931, we were unable to use lagged 
terms. 
38  The investment rate of 0.033 is for the fiscal year of 1932. Further study is needed to 
determine whether this rate is high or low relative to other years. 
39  The sample of 174 companies included 27 with negative investment. While this occurs in 
cases of substantial capital wastage, it may also be an artifact of account processing. In 
such cases, estimation results may be biased. In our analysis, estimates for the 147 
companies excluding these 27 showed that all estimated coefficients for independent 
variables were statistically significant and at roughly the same levels as coefficients 
estimated based on the sample of 174 companies. This means the 27 companies did not 
significantly affect estimation results. Thus, the following analysis is based on estimation 
results for the sample of 174 companies, including those with negative investment. 
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to after as the “no supplementary installment sample”), the average value
variables in the supplementary installment samples are 0.067 for investme
0.038 for rates of change in sales, 0.029 for cash flow rates, 0.491 for ratios of debt to 
assets, and 0.053 for supplementary installment rates. Average values for each 
variable in the no supplementary installments sample are 0.028 for investment rates,
0.055 for rates of change in sales, 0.051 for cash flow rates, and 0.346 for ratios of deb
to assets. Compared to companies in the no supplementary installment sample, 
in the supplementary installment sample are characterized by higher rates of 
investment and ratios of debt to assets but lower rates of change in sales and cash flow.
 
3.3 Regression results 
3.3.1 Estimates for the entire sample and subsamples 






e estimate investment functions for the entire sample, the supplementary 
 the no supplementary installment sample.40 The results are 




shown in Table 6.41 The results of estimates for the ent
coefficient for change in sales (β1) is positive and statistically significant, indi
that companies adjusted capital stock through investments corresponding to changes 
in sales. The coefficient of cash flow (β2) is positive and statistically significant, 
suggesting the presence of liquidity constraints arising from factors such as 
information asymmetry.42 In addition, the coefficient for the ratio of debt to assets (β3) 
                                                  
40  Although many companies showed zero supplementary installments, this does not mean 
all of these companies were in the same financial situation with regard to supplementary 
installments. Statistically, the variable of supplementary installments assumes a correct 
e, 
 did not 
ple including 
w
d ns using 
l 
y interest on such debts (Shimura [1969]). Under these 
value when positive but is zero when the correct value is less than zero. Since OLS 
estimates using such variables as an independent variable can introduce bias, we 
performed separate estimates for the entire sample, the supplementary installment sampl
and the no supplementary installment sample, then compared the results.   
41  Some companies, including companies belonging to three large zaibatsu groups,
release data on depreciation during the interwar period. Previous studies argue that it may 
be inappropriate to use gross investment as an investment variable for a sam
zaibatsu members (Miyajima [2004], p. 234). Since companies whose depreciation data in 
Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki is zero may represent such cases, we also estimate 
investment functions in which another variable is used as a proxy for depreciation. When 
e assume that the depreciation rates of companies with zero depreciation are average 
epreciation rates for their respective industries and estimate investment functio
investment and cash flow calculated from the modified depreciation rate, their estimated 
coefficients are nearly the same as those for the original data, with comparable statistica
significance. This result suggests that nondisclosure of depreciation does not significantly 
affect the estimation in this paper. 
42  In prewar Japan, many shareholders borrowed funds from banks by equity-collateral 
financing and used the funds to pay for stocks. These investors had a strong preference for 
dividends, given the obligation to pa
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is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that investments are constrained by
excessive debt. These results are generally consistent with those of Miyajima’s [2004] 
estimation. 
   The
 





                                                                                                                                                 
and statistically significant, indicating a positive correlation between supplementary 
installments and investments.43,44 Furthermore, the estimated coefficient for 
supplementary installments (β4) is 0.666, indicating a relationship wherein an
of one unit in stock supplementary installments corresponds to an increase in 
investment of 0.666 units. This means the effect of supplementary installments
inducing investment exceeds that of cash flow (coefficient β2 = 0.305). In Section 2 
(Table 3), we showed that more than 70% of the 33 companies mentioned in magaz
articles as collecting supplementary installments intended to use the funds for 
investment (14 companies) or investment and debt repayment (11 companies). T
results are consistent with the case studies.45,46 
 







4 t in 
 
 borrowed funds 
s—the relative 
 on 
investment projects, potentially strengthening the link between investment and cash flow
43  We also examine means of fund-raising other than supplementary installments. For 
fund-raising by the 174 companies in the sample (on a stock basis, as of the end of the fiscal 
year of 1931), stocks had the highest weight (43.7% of total assets as of the end of the fisc
year of 1931), followed by bonds (22.1%). Thus, we estimate investment functions using the 
balance of bonds issued as an independent variable. However, the results were statistica
insignificant. While we find no positive correlation between the balance of bonds issued and 
investment, we confirm a positive correlation between supplementary installments on 
part-paid stock and investment, suggesting the importance of the part-paid stock system in 
corporate finance as of fiscal 1932. Stock finance consists of capital increases (initial 
payments) and supplementary installments. Given the difficulty in fiscal 1932 of carrying 
through a capital increase requiring approval at a shareholders’ meeting, only two firm
the sample made the attempt. Given the very small number of companies conducting a 
capital increase, we omit the corresponding analysis. We do not focus on bank loans fo
following reasons: First, data on bank loans is not necessarily available for the sample. 
Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan do not differentiate bank 
loans from other liabilities. Second, in the prewar period, notes payable, which originally
represented inter-company credit, included bank loans (i.e., notes payable issued to banks) 
to an extent that cannot be disregarded (Fujino and Teranishi [2000]). 
4  Research on the relationship between fund-raising methods and corporate investmen
the present Japanese firms includes Suzuki [2001] and Ogawa [2003]. 
45  What funding source shareholders used to pay supplementary installments remains open
to question. Although shareholders in prewar Japan are known to have
from banks using equity-collateral financing—that is, borrowing against the same stocks on 
which a company called for supplementary installments and other stock
significance of such borrowings in each period remains unclear (Kataoka and Teranishi 
[1996]). Here, we address the possibility that in certain cases covered in Section 2, 
shareholders may have borrowed from banks against the very stocks on which a company 
called for supplementary installments, using those funds to pay supplementary 
installments. As seen in Section 2, the price of Dai-Nippon Sugar’s third issue of shares,
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   While estimates for the supplementary installment sample indicate that the 
coefficient for change in sales and the coefficient for stock supplementary installments 
are positive and statistically significant, we are unable to obtain statistically 
significant results for the coefficients of cash flow and the ratio of debt to total assets. 
Although a wide range of reasons may explain these results, one possible 
interpretation is that supplementary installments eased liquidity constraints and debt 
constraints on corporate fund-raising. The estimate for the no supplementary 
installment sample shows that the coefficient of change in sales is positive and 
statistically significant; the coefficient of cash flow is positive and statistically 
significant; and the coefficient of the ratio of debt to total assets is negative and 
statistically significant. (The estimate excludes supplementary installments, since the 
sample consists of companies that did not collect supplementary installments.) Based 
on the results of estimates for the entire sample, the supplementary installment 
  sample, and the no supplementary installment sample, the capital investment function
                                                                                                                                                  
which the company called for a 12.5-yen supplementary installment, was 1.3 yen, while 
that of Oita Cement’s shares on which the company called for a 6.5-yen supplementary 
installment was 0.20 yen. Both stocks at that time were valued significantly below the 
amount of their supplementary installments. In addition, the price of Shirokiya’s new 
shares, on which the company called for a 5-yen supplementary installment, were 
approximately six yen. Since a collateral weight over market price was not 80% or more for 
stocks in principal (see Hattori [1914], Kasuga [1925], Ikeda and Oyachi [1929]), it appears 
likely that the collateral value of Shirokiya’s new shares was less than the supplementary 
installment amount. In these cases, we can conclude that shareholders would have 
encountered difficulty raising funds for payment via equity-collateral financing using as 
collateral the stocks on which the companies called for supplementary installments; and 
that they instead paid supplementary installments by drawing on their own private funds 
or by other means (including borrowing from banks using other stock holdings as 
collateral). 
46  Numerous previous studies showed that banks during the Meiji Era did not lend to 
joint-stock companies or to other firms directly, but to merchants, landowners, and other 
individuals through equity-collateral financing. These individuals in turn provided funds to 
joint-stock companies in the form of subscriptions for shares or in other forms (for some 
recent studies, see Teranishi [2007], Ishii [2007], Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies, Bank of Japan [2006]). Teranishi [1982] argued that given the crude state of bank 
credit investigations and accumulated information on borrowers during the Meiji Era, 
economic agents in positions superior to those of banks with respect to information on the 
creditworthiness of borrowers often served as intermediaries between banks and borrowers. 
He defined such financial intermediation as “duplicated intermediation” and gave examples 
of toiyasei maegashi kinyu (“advance-payment financing system by wholesalers”) used in 
the thread-making industry, trading-company finance in the spinning industry, and finance 
by rice merchants, landowners, and others in agriculture, in addition to equity-collateral 
financing. Such mechanisms may have continued to function into the early 1930s, and it is 
possible bank funds invested in companies via shareholders, who could more effectively 
monitor companies when business conditions declined. This issue requires further study. 
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based on the entire sample appears to incorporate the relationship seen for the 
supplementary installment sample (in which part-paid stock increases capital 
investment) and the relationship in the no supplementary installment sample 
(whereby cash flow increases and the ratio of debt to total assets constrains capi
investment). 
 





ow we consider the relationship between corporate investment, supplementary 
for supplementary installments and cash flow (SI/K･CF/K) to our 
At a company collecting supplementary installments, we would expect a 
 
oefficient of cash flow (β2 + βcSI/K) would be smaller for such companies than for 
me as 
uggesting that supplementary installments ease 
quidity  flow 
ple, 
hat 
                                                 
N
installments, and liquidity constraints. We estimate investment functions by adding 
the intersection term 
independent variables.47 
 
 I/K = α + β1ΔY/K + (β2 + βcSI/K) CF/K + β3DE/AS + β4SI/K + ΔγDummy + ε 
 
  
decline in the effects of cash flow with relaxed liquidity constraints. That is, the
c
companies not collecting supplementary installments (coefficient: β2), meaning βc 
should be negative. The expected signs for coefficients β1, β2, β3, and β4 are the sa
in the preceding investment function. 
   Table 7 shows the results of regression. βc is negative and statistically 
significant, while the estimated values for the other coefficients have the expected 
signs and are statistically significant, s
li  constraints. The extent to which the intersection term reduces the cash
coefficient depends on the scale of the supplementary installments (SI/K). For exam
while the coefficient of cash flow is 0.342 (= β2), if supplementary installments (SI/K) 
are zero, it declines to 0.301 if the level is the average value for the entire sample 
(0.007) and to 0.035 if the level is the average value for the supplementary installment 
sample (0.053). 
   These results are consistent with the case study in Section 2, suggesting t
 
47  Miyajima [2004] examined the effects of the type of corporate governance, including the 
corporate governance typical of the firms affiliated with three large zaibatsu, based on an 
analysis of the intersection term between variables representing the structure of corporate 
governance and cash flow. 
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in the early 1930s, under the capital system of joint-stock companies with part-paid 







ar Japan’s capital stock 
ystem of joint-stock companies represented a fund-raising tool with which companies 
ount and timing of payments. Since the Commercial Code and 
r 
, 
                                                 
increased corporate investment. Still, certain precautions are in order when 
interpreting these results. First, the estimated investment function is for a single poi
in time: fiscal 1932. Since adjustment costs accompany investment, adjustments t
optimal capital stock would not occur immediately due to investment in a sin
but gradually through investments over multiple periods. In addition, the function of 
supplementary installments may vary over time. For example, it is unclear what 
effects supplementary installments would have on a company’s cash management and 
investment if financial markets eased.48 Future research needs to address these points
by extending the sample periods. Furthermore, while supplementary installments
appear to promote investment in times of increasing demand, it remains unclear 
whether they increased company value or productivity.49 Another topic requiring 
further study is why so many shareholders complied with requests for supplementa
installments and where they obtained the funds to do so. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Supplementary installments on part-paid stocks under prew
s
could determine the am
articles of association specified sanctions if shareholders failed to comply with calls fo
payment, the system functioned as an effective fund-raising last resort. This paper 
considered the effects of supplementary installments on corporate finance and 
investments in the early 1930s. We first outlined how part-paid stocks and multiple 
installments on stocks in joint-stock company were introduced and legislated. The 
system was initially adopted by companies such as national banks and insurers
playing a major role in the spinning and railway industries. The system was 
 
48  A comparison of corporate fund-raising methods in fiscal 1932 and fiscal 1936 shows that 
the weight of supplementary installments in 1936, when financial markets were less 
constrained than in 1932, was lower. Based on a common sample of 160 companies for 
which information is available at both points in time, the ratio of supplementary 
installments to total funds raised–with the latter representing the sum of capital increases 
(first payments), supplementary installments, bonds, and other long-term debts (including 
bank loans)–was 62.5% in 1932, compared to 49.0% in 1936. This suggests that 
supplementary installments played a more important role in 1932, when financial markets 
were tight. 
49  For example, in bubble periods, such as the boom following World War I, supplementary 
installments may have led to excessive investment. 
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incorporated into the Commercial Code of Japan, following inclusion in Roesler’s dr
of the Commercial Code. Historical materials, including financial statements and
company histories, indicate that companies during the interwar period across
range of industries, including Tokyo Underground Railway, Dai-Nippon Sugar, Oita 
Cement, Keio Electric Railway, and Ujigawa Electric Power, called for supplement
installments and used the funds thus raised for investments and debt repayment.   
   In addition, we constructed a new company financial data set incorporating 
data on supplementary installments from Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki and Kabushik
Gaisha Nenkan, estimating cross-sectional investment functions for fiscal 1932. The
aft 
 













                                                 
regression results suggest that while liquidity constraints and debt constraints hurt 
corporate investment, supplementary installments helped offset these conditions, 
quidity and promoting investment. Although financial markets tightened
and corporate investment activities were relatively inactive in the early 1930s, 
supplementary installments helped stem further declines in investment. 
   In considering economic development and corporate behavior in prewar Japan
one must keep in mind that these events and trends occurred under institutiona
frameworks and financial structures that differ from those in place today.
business and economic historians emphasize the role of Takahashi’s economic policies 
in the recovery from the Showa depression – namely, allowing exchange rates to fa
without interference, high public expenditures, and low interest rates.50 Others a
that the economy and financial systems of interwar Japan had the efficiency and 
flexibility to adjust to and overcome external shocks, including the worldwide econom
depression (Great Depression).51 From the latter perspective, we examined the 
relationship between supplementary installments and corporate finance and 
investment, concluding that the part-paid stock system helped stabilize corporate cash 
management and encouraged investment. We believe future research should add
broader range of aspects of financial and corporate systems during interwar J
 
50  A significant body of literature examines Takahashi’s economic policies. See, for example, 
Nakamura [1971], Miwa [1982], Ito [1989], and Cha [2003]. 
51  Representative research includes Hashimoto [1984], who argued that productivity, 
backed by flexible labor markets, improved during the Showa depression. He referred to the 
high potential of the Japanese economy to respond to shocks as “strong Japanese 
capitalism.” Nanjo [2002] argued that despite the rise in nonperforming loans attributable 
to falling land prices, the banking system in Japan retained its overall soundness due to 
high shareholder equity ratios, which served as a buffer against losses. 
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Table  1     
Payment for stock of Osaka Cotton Spinning     
(Units: yen)
5 Startup costs
19.14 First machinery expenditures
16.467 Second machinery expenditures
14.322 Third machinery expenditures
12 First mill construction expenditures
12 Second mill construction expenditures
11.071 Remaining balance of machinery and construction expenditures
10 Plant construction and operating capital
100 Total
25,000.00

















Table  2     








June 30, 1882 116,330 557,798 4.79
December 31, 1882 115,491 685,867 5.94
June 30, 1883 119,500 1,243,278 10.4
December 31, 1883 119,500 2,442,103 20.44
July 1, 1884 119,314 3,821,872 32.03
December 31, 1884 119,314 4,058,386 34.01
June 30, 1885 119,314 4,582,348 38.41
December 31, 1885 119,314 4,784,692 40.1
June 30, 1886 119,314 5,006,288 41.96
December 31, 1886 119,314 5,241,772 43.93
Source: Financial Report of Japan Railway
Notes:
(1) The subsequent paid-in amounts after December 31, 1886
are unclear. Payment was completed over the period from April
1 through September 30, 1888.
(Units: shares, yen)
(2) As of June 30, 1885, the second offering of shares was for
117,276 shares, with a paid-in amount of 580,300 yen.
 Table 3    
Purpose of collection of payment    
Year Period Investment Both Repayment Total
1930 January–June 1 3 0 4
July–December 2 1 3 6
1931 January–June 5 4 2 11
July–December 0 1 2 3
1932 January–June 0 2 0 2
July–December 6 0 1 7
Total 14 11 8 33
(2) Categorized by month of payment collection.
Source: Articles over the period from 1930 through 1932 in Economist,
Diamond, and Toyo Keizai Shimpo
Notes:
(Units: cases)




T a b l e   4           
  Financial and economic developments in the early 1930s  
0.5 1.1 0.4 4.4 10.1 8.7
Personal consumption -0.7 0.4 2.2 -1.4 6.8 6.3
Private-sector capital investment 7.0 4.5 -22.7 -14.2 31.0 39.6
Residential investment 10.5 -11.0 4.3 3.7 0.0 3.2
Government expenditures -2.2 -4.3 15.7 13.3 6.5 -4.3
Exports 10.1 1.2 5.4 19.4 5.8 28.6
Imports 4.1 -6.0 13.7 -2.8 -2.8 12.9
-1.7 -10.9 -9.6 -1.8 2.1 1.7
8.4 8.0 8.1 8.4 8.0 7.4
-4.0 -5.9 -3.3 -4.7 -3.1 -2.5
577 149 184 243 911 1,458
399 197 185 149 448 577
104.1 74.0 73.5 69.9 98.9 116.6
480 447 372 353 351 361 Land prices (rice paddies; yen/tan)
Sources: Estimates of long-term economic statistics, Annual Report of the Banking
Bureau, Statistics of Capital paid for loans and stocks, Statistics of bonds, notes and
shares
Real GNP (year-on-year percentage change)
GNP deflator (year-on-year percentage change)
Interest rate on bills (June, average, %)
Lending balances of ordinary banks
(year-on –year percentage change)
Payments on company bonds (millions yen)
Payments on stock (millions yen)
Stock price index (June; Jan. 1924 = 100)
1932 1933 1934 1929 1930 1931Table  5       
  Descriptive statistics on sample data      
Average Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Capital investment rate (I/K) 0.033 0.070 -0.358 0.347
Increase/decrease rate of sales (DY/K) 0.053 0.174 -0.299 1.410
Cash flow rate (CF/K) 0.048 0.063 -0.110 0.430
Debt/total assets (DE/AS) 0.363 0.197 0.005 0.895
Stock supplementary installment rate (SI/K) 0.007 0.027 0.000 0.208
Average Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Capital investment rate (I/K) 0.067 0.080 -0.027 0.250
Increase/decrease rate of sales (DY/K) 0.038 0.084 -0.023 0.343
Cash flow rate (CF/K) 0.029 0.052 -0.033 0.197
Debt/total assets (DE/AS) 0.491 0.135 0.128 0.790
Stock supplementary installment rate (SI/K) 0.053 0.058 0.000 0.208
Average Standard
deviation Minimum Maximum
Capital investment rate (I/K) 0.028 0.068 -0.358 0.347
Increase/decrease rate of sales (DY/K) 0.055 0.183 -0.299 1.410
Cash flow rate (CF/K) 0.051 0.066 -0.110 0.430
Debt/total assets (DE/AS) 0.346 0.197 0.005 0.895
Stock supplementary installment rate (SI/K) ― ― ― ―
Sources: Honpo Jigyo-Seiseki Bunseki, Kabushiki Gaisha Nenkan
(3) No supplementary installment sample (152 companies)
(2) Supplementary installment sample (22 companies)
(1) Entire sample (174 companies)
 
 Estimation results of capital investment function (FY 1932)           
t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic
Constant (a) 0.020 ** 2.21 -0.028 * -1.79 0.017 * 1.77
Increase/decrease in sales (b1) 0.083 *** 2.75 0.294 * 1.84 0.080 *** 2.62
Cash flow (b2) 0.305 *** 2.97 　　　　　― ― 0.343 *** 3.22
Debt/total assets (b3) -0.070 ** -2.52 　　　　　― ― -0.064 ** -2.18
Stock supplementary
installment (b4) 0.666 *** 2.64 0.921 ** 2.76 　　― ―
adjusted R2 0.359 0.719 0.323
Notes:
2. The symbols ***, **, and * denote the statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
3. Industry dummy variables omitted.
Estimated value Estimated value Estimated value








T a b l e   6              Table  7      
  Estimation results for the model including the intersection term 
  (FY 1932, 174 companies)     
t- statistic
Constant (a) 0.017 * 1.91
Increase/decrease in sales (b1) 0.079 *** 2.63
Cash flow (b2) 0.342 *** 3.32
Cash-flow x stock supplementary 
installment (bc) -5.795 *** -4.97
Debt/total assets (b3) -0.067 ** -2.42
Stock supplementary installment (b4) 1.128 *** 6.36
adjusted R2 0.385
Notes:
3. Sector dummy 
2. The symbols ***, **




, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,                 
pectively.
ated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and applied White correction.
 